Francis Nosa Okoemu is a Nigerian security expert based in the United Kingdom. He holds a BA Degree in Contemporary Military and International History, a Master’s Degree in Terrorism and Security Studies, and PGD in Intelligence and Security Studies, both awarded by the University of Salford, Manchester, UK. Okoemu has attended counter-terrorism courses in Israel, the United States of America, and other security courses in the UK, which include close protection, intelligence gathering and terrorism threat and response. He is a member of the UK’s Security Industry Authority (SIA) and chairman /CEO, Blackwell Security Consultancy, UK Ltd. In this exclusive interview with News Express, Okoemu, who has spent considerable time studying the Boko Haram insurgency, speaks on the missing link in the counter-insurgency war and suggests ways to win the war. Please read on.
News Express: For seven years, Nigeria has been in the grip of Boko Haram insurgency. As a security expert, did you see this happening?
Francis Nosa Okoemu: The short answer is “yes”. Nigeria is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society, and the deep divisions along these lines have been apparent for decades.
Having said that, many other countries that are populated by different religious and ethnic groups have not spawned a vicious terrorist sect like Boko Haram. The reasons that allow Boko Haram to flourish are many and complex, but may be summarised in terms of specifically Nigerian problems: the legacy of colonialism, poverty and inequality, democratic immaturity, corrupt political systems and corrupt security agents.
Radical Islamist groups such as Boko Haram operate according to a jihadist mindset wherein certain secular ideas, especially those drawn from the West relating to education, are demonised to justify terrorist attacks. What is key here is that scholars of terrorism have shown that there are four interrelated stages in the formulation of extreme ideologies such as those of Boko Haram. The first is what political thinkers call “context”: potential members of Boko Haram see the world around them and conclude that “it’s not right” (I’m poor, I’m hungry, and so on). The second is “comparison”: again, they look at Nigerian society and their place in it and they conclude “it’s not fair” (other people are richer than me for no apparent reason). Then we turn to “attribution”: it’s your fault (colonialism, the West, corrupt people in power), and, finally we get the “reaction”: because you have made me poor, hungry, lacking in opportunity, you must be evil. It isn’t that difficult to see how this mindset is ready for radicalisation.
How would you assess the efforts of succeeding administrations, from General Obasanjo to Dr Jonathan, to tackle the insurgency?
Before we can assess the efforts of the Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, and Jonathan administrations, we first have to establish the exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram sect. It is generally accepted that the movement first appeared (in the form we recognise today) in 2003, although at that time the sect did not pose a major threat to Nigerian society as a whole and was only operating in a small area in Yobe State. The election in 2007 opened a window of opportunity for Boko Haram to flourish. Consequently, we don’t really know how Obasanjo would have tackled the sect and thinking about his strategies, in retrospect, is redundant.
To be fair to Ya’Adua, he was occupied with two major issues during his tenure: the militancy in the Niger Delta and his personal health problems.
I think Jonathan could, or would, not tackle the insurgency for many reasons. Firstly, if we think back to political theorists’ first stage of creating a terrorist – “context” – the northern part of Nigeria has the highest rate of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in the country. President Jonathan simply failed to address these issues.
In addition, corruption during the Jonathan administration was like an epidemic that spread across the entire country. A failure to use the country’s rich resources for the benefit of all its citizens meant that the political theorists’ idea of “it’s not fair” took hold amongst some young men in the North. Let’s quote from the former US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, who noted on a visit to Nigeria: “The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the Federal, State and local levels … Lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to rise of groups that embrace violence and reject authority of the state.”
Jonathan also miscalculated when he wanted to use the Boko Haram insurgency to gain sympathy during the 2015 election and, for that reason, he left it too late to put proper resources into fighting the sect.
Nigeria’s military commanders did not help matters: rather, they saw Jonathan’s administration as an opportunity to enrich themselves. Let’s just say that our military chiefs have not been particularly interested in fighting Boko Haram as long as they receive their pay cheques.
One of the first things President Buhari did on assuming power was to relocate the War Control Centre to Maiduguri. How wise is this, from a professional security point of view?
Moving the War Control Centre to the war zone was essential: Buhari, unlike his predecessors, was showing that he wanted to “take the fight” to Boko Haram. However, although Buhari’s strategy at the time seemed advisable, and mirrored the American style of fighting insurgency by taking the war to the enemy, it wasn’t as effective in Nigeria. On the contrary, I think it gave a kind of warning to the sect that “we are coming to attack you”. Such bold moves really need to be backed up by unbeatable military strength.
However, the decision that Buhari took that will help to defeat Boko Haram is the appointments of the Chief of Army Staff, General Buratai from Borno State, NSA, Major-General, Monguno (rtd.) from Borno State, and Air Chief of Staff, AVM, Sadique Abubakar, from Bauchi State. Mature, experienced, non-corrupt military leaders are essential in the battle against Boko Haram.
The insurgency has worsened since President Buhari assumed office on May 29. What would you say is responsible for this?
This is always the case when there is a change of leadership and when new strategies and commanders are put in place. Furthermore, I sense that the murderous sect themselves are trying to carry out almost “last gasp” atrocities because they know we are working on more well-thought-through, effective strategies to oppose them.
Would you say there is a missing link in the war against Boko Haram? If so, what is it?
It’s not so much that there are “missing links” in terms of people, given that we have the apparent commitment of local government and state bodies, as well as international partners: unfortunately, so far, they have all failed. For me, the “weak link” is all about the corruption in our system, mismanagement of public funds, and a seeming inability for everyone interested in defeating this death cult to work together.
For instance, there is a definite link between Boko Haram and other sects across our borders such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS and, to some extent, Al Qaeda. Our borders are very porous and this assists in the free movement of arms and terrorists in and out of the country.
If you were to advise President Buhari, what would you tell him to do to quickly end this insurgency?
The situation is desperate: President Buhari should send a very strong and clear message to Boko Haram, giving them the ultimatum that they either agree to dialogue or they will face the fire power of our armed forces. The emphasis should always be placed on eschewing violence and seeking non-military solutions. Having said this, such an ultimatum would only be effective if the President is willing to ensure that our forces are well-equipped and free of corruption. This may require international input in terms of training, equipment, or even personnel, in particular in relation to intelligence-gathering (in cooperation with the National Intelligence Agency) and patrolling our porous borders, especially in the North-East of the country.
We also have to launch a simultaneous offensive against the ideology of extremism. The governments of West Africa should meet to agree that there is a collective responsibility to promote religious tolerance and root out religious fundamentalism in our education systems. Whether unilaterally, or as part of a pan-African body, we should set up a panel to determine the reasons for the emergence of Islamic extremism in Africa, its sponsors, and its connection to other sects that are active on the continent. It is essential that religious leaders of all relevant faiths are made welcome and active participants in any such discussions.
Perhaps of most importance is the need to deter impoverished people from being attracted to Boko Haram’s ideology in the first place. This means creating jobs for young men and women, bearing in mind the old saying, “an idle man is the devil’s workshop”. Winning the hearts and minds of the local people is an absolute necessity. We need to acknowledge that the Boko Haram insurgents are not spirits, but real people who are living amongst local people. (The British used the “winning the hearts and minds” method in Malaya in the1960s, as did the Americans in Iraq in the early 2000s.)
This doesn’t mean we should follow Western methods of tackling terrorism blindly. (After all, part of the “it’s not fair” narrative that creates extremism is that the West has – undoubtedly – treated Africa and Africans appallingly.) I don’t want a situation where we overreact in the way the US overreacted to the 9/11 attacks when they launched the so-called “War on Terror” that has caused such instability and increased violence in the Middle East and Africa.
We should, rather, follow the UK example. Britain is more resilient when it comes to terrorist attacks, largely due to their experience in Northern Ireland. In the face of Irish Republican terrorism, they used a limited amount of coercion to counter insurgency, and rather emphasised the importance of “using minimum force” in order to win the hearts and minds of the local people. General Obasanjo has already advocated the use of “carrots and sticks”, which I consider to be reasonable. We cannot win this war by the use of force alone: we need to invite these terrorists to the table.
I don’t believe we can achieve peace by force and nothing will be gained by pushing Boko Haram fighters into hiding. The aim must be their total surrender, but such a surrender can only come about because we have acknowledged and begun to address the political theorists’ “it’s not right, it’s not fair, it’s your fault” trajectory that created Boko Haram in the first place.
Tell us about yourself.
My name is Francis Nosa Okoemu. I am a Nigerian national from Ewatto, in Esan South-East Local Government Area, Edo State. For over 24 years I have lived in Germany and the United Kingdom in order to undertake higher education studies. I hold a BA Degree in Contemporary Military and International History, a Master’s Degree in Terrorism and Security Studies, and PGD, in Intelligence and Security Studies, both awarded by the University of Salford, Manchester, UK. My postgraduate research thesis was on “The Relationship Between Transitions to Democracy and Religiously-Inspired Terrorism: The case of Nigeria”. I also studied in Germany for my Diploma in Germany History, and War studies, I speak fluent Deutsch. In addition, I have attended counter-terrorism courses in Israel, the United States of America, and other security courses in the UK, which include close protection, intelligence gathering and terrorism threat and response.
I am a member of the UK’s Security Industry Authority (SIA).
Currently, I am the chairman /CEO, Blackwell Security Consultancy, UK. Ltd.
•Photo shows Francis Nosa Okoemu.
