A restrictive new immigration law being debated in parliament has huge implications, not only for people seeking asylum in Britain but also for British citizens.

The nationality and borders bill is now in the House of Lords for readings after passing through the House of Commons. The bill makes it a criminal offence to arrive in the UK without permission, with a maximum sentence of up to four years. The bill lets the UK send asylum seekers to a “safe third country”, and can allow for offshore processing centres overseas instead of considering their asylum claims in the UK.

In November, home secretary Priti Patel introduced a provision that would allow the government to strip people of their British citizenship without notice, which was debated for nine minutes in the House of Commons before passage on December 8.

Citizenship stripping can take place for public interest reasons, mostly connected to national security and counter-terrorism. These decisions come into effect even before appeals can be processed, so it is crucial for the affected person to be notified. The UK has had a recent, significant rise in citizenship deprivations. Most have taken place when the British citizen is already overseas, so they would be unlikely to know about cancellation orders and would find it difficult to appeal.

A well-known recent case is that of Shamima Begum, who went to Syria at the age of 15, and had her citizenship removed. In a recent judgment, the supreme court held that Begum could not return to the UK to challenge her deprivation order in person. While Begum had a right to a fair hearing, this right did not trump all other considerations, such as the safety of the public.

The British Nationality Act 1981 requires the secretary of state to give a person written notice of a decision to deprive them of their British citizenship before a deprivation order can be made. Clause 9 in the new bill exempts the government from giving notice if it is not “reasonably practicable” to do so, or in the interests of national security, diplomatic relations or is otherwise in the public interest.

This gives the government enormous power over British citizens who have another nationality or who may have been born elsewhere. Effectively, naturalised citizens can be made stateless without notice. The government, however, claims that it will not make anyone stateless and will not affect their right to appeal.

The abrupt addition of this provision is particularly concerning, as it was not mentioned in consultations or included in the original bill.

Why now?

Patel’s attempt in clause 9 to take away notice requirements appears to be a direct reaction to the case of D4, a British citizen who was in Syria to allegedly join Islamic State. Her citizenship was cancelled in 2019 and a notice of that decision was placed on her home office file as per a 2018 regulation. D4 knew nothing of the decision to deprive her of her citizenship.

In July 2021, the high court decided that this was not enough notice for removing citizenship. The court found that the 2018 regulation went beyond the powers granted by parliament with regards to serving notice. The judge considered it unlawful – a private act of putting something in a drawer and locking it, rather than actually notifying anyone.

The new clause 9 contains a subsection that renders the provision about secret deprivations retroactive as well, so as to wholly neutralise the effect of the court’s judgment in D4.

The new bill could affect an estimated 6 million Britons who were born elsewhere or have another nationality. This provision makes these citizens far more vulnerable, despite the government’s assertion that these powers are rarely used, and only against the “very worst”.

The government claims that the vast majority of these millions of people are very unlikely to be in war areas fighting against British interests. Yet these powers are framed widely and could indeed be used far beyond the national-security emergency scenario.

Citizenship stripping orders are not obtained from any court or tribunal and are based entirely on the discretion of the home secretary. UK law empowers the home secretary to deprive nationality of British citizens who have another nationality, if the secretary deems it “conducive to the public good”. The home secretary can also deprive naturalised citizens of their citizenship – even if this results in their statelessness – if the home secretary finds “reasonable grounds that the person is able to become a citizen of another state”.

Currently, no other country can make its own citizens stateless by depriving them of citizenship without notice.

The UK’s citizenship deprivation practice affects minorities and those of migrant heritage much more than it does white British nationals born in Britain. The Begum case demonstrated that an appeal against deprivation orders can remain indefinitely suspended. Taking away notification requirements will make appeals even harder. Even without this change, deprivation laws risk alienating minority communities, but with it, potential challenges in courts will be eliminated at source.

This piece has been updated to clarify the nature of the nine minutes of debate on the bill on December 8.

Devyani Prabhat, Professor in Law, University of Bristol

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Tom Simcock, Edge Hill University

Around 2.8 million households across England casually rented out part of or their entire home on platforms such as Airbnb in 2017-18.

These platforms are part of the “sharing economy” and have opened up new avenues for tourism. Since its founding in 2008, Airbnb has enabled millions of “hosts” around the world to let out their spare space – whether this is an extra bedroom or an entire home.

In 2015, the UK government deregulated short-term rentals in London, allowing homeowners to share their home for up to 90 nights per year without planning permission. However, it is not just private homeowners who are taking advantage of this system.

Research has found that instead of offering their property as a longer-term rental, some landlords were moving their houses on to Airbnb where they can make higher profits. This raises concerns about the impact of short-term rental activity on housing availability and affordability in London.

In our new research at Edge Hill University, we looked at the growth of Airbnb activity in London to understand in greater depth how properties are being shared on the platform – and by whom. Using data provided by InsideAirbnb and author and researcher Tom Slee, we analysed the Airbnb platform for listings in London between 2014-19.

Our findings reveal worrying trends amid considerable growth in Airbnb activity across London. Since 2014, there has been a 571% increase in the number of entire home listings, with nearly 45,000 entire properties available to rent. There has also been substantial growth in what could be classed as “commercial” activity rather than occasional home sharing.

Not just spare rooms

One indicator of commercial rental activity is the availability of a property on the platform. If a property is being shared when the host is away, then the property would only be available for a limited number of nights per year. On the other hand, a home that is available for more than 90 nights per year, we argue, indicates that this is a commercial activity.

We found that since 2015 the number of entire home listings that were available for more than 90 nights had increased by 123% to just over 18,000 homes. We further found that 61% of these properties were offered by hosts with more than one property, and this activity had increased by 275% since 2015.

An Airbnb spokesperson told The Conversation: “This research uses a flawed methodology focused on calendar availability data gathered from third parties. In reality the typical entire home listing on Airbnb in London is let for just 35 nights a year and there are very few exceptions where a listing is let for 90 nights or more. Airbnb was the first platform to introduce a 90 night cap to voluntarily enforce rules in London and has for years led calls in partnership with City Hall for a short-term let register to be introduced.”

Another indicator of commercial rental activity is to examine the number of entire property listings provided by hosts with two or more entire property listings. We found that these listings had increased by 480% since 2015 to nearly 20,000 homes. We also found that only 12% of hosts had more than one property.

We were able to break the data down further by examining the impact on different local areas within London. We found that there is a concentration of entire property listings provided by hosts with two or more properties in a few London boroughs, specifically Westminster (23% of listings), Kensington and Chelsea (15% of listings) and Camden (10% of listings). Other researchers found similar results in other large cities including New York, Madrid and Berlin.

Renting and displacement

The activity we found in Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea and Camden is likely to lead to displacement for communities in these neighbourhoods. Researchers term this tourism gentrification, where tourists displace residents from their local communities through increases in rental prices and decreased housing availability, making it difficult for people to find an affordable home to rent in their local neighbourhood.

Our findings reveal that a significant portion of the Airbnb activity in London is not what could be seen as the authentic sharing of homes, where the asset is being underused (a spare bedroom, for example), but commercial activity. It is unlikely that local communities can access and realise the benefits of the sharing economy as intended.

Landlords are attracted to the short-term rental market because of what is termed a technological rent gap. Platforms such as Airbnb make it easier for landlords to access the short-term holiday rental market – where they are able to make higher profits by offering their property as a short-term rental instead of a home to rent for the long term.

Airbnb has taken action to limit this activity by enforcing the 90 night limit in London, by automatically stopping properties being booked for more than 90 nights without evidence of planning permission. But there is evidence that some landlords are bypassing the system by setting up new listings for the property or using multiple platforms to advertise the property. There is a need to limit landlords from using homes on these platforms for the long term, by using a local registration and licensing scheme.

Airbnb and similar platforms could be a force for good, by enabling people to access unique places, and by sharing excess capacity in existing homes. However, the platform enables landlords to make higher profits by choosing tourists over providing homes for the long term – contributing to the gentrification of neighbourhoods and displacing local communities through higher rents and property prices.

Governments across the UK are planning on introducing significant rental reforms, such as the Renters Reform bill in England. Further reforms could drive more landlords to use Airbnb over providing long-term housing. Care must be taken to ensure that further properties are not lost from the residential sector.

Tom Simcock, Research Fellow, Edge Hill University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

UK-based Yoruba nationalist, Adeyinka Grandson has been convicted on charges of terrorism, inciting genocide and conspiracy to commit terrorism.

The President of the Young Yorubas for Freedom (YYF) secessionist group was arrested in August 2019 by the Scotland Yard Counter Terrorism Command London and the Metropolitan Police, following an approval granted by Westminster Magistrates’ Court in London.

Adeyinka became popular on social media after issuing threats majorly targeted at Igbos living in South-West states.  He further called for the Yoruba race to secede from Nigeria, and also allegedly threatened the north with the use of chemical weapons if the South-West is attacked under any guise.

Upon being arrested on charges of “stirring racial discrimination” and “encouraging terrorism", his passport, two Google phones, one Apple MacBook laptop computer, one tablet, a hard drive and a draft copy of his new book were seized.

British television, Ben TV reported that Adeyinka was convicted on all charges which include terrorism, inciting genocide and conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Kris Gledhill, Auckland University of Technology

With most COVID-19 restrictions now lifted in England, the world is watching to see what this so-called “freedom day” will bring.

Some scepticism is warranted, given Britain’s approach throughout the pandemic has hardly been a success. By July 19, there had been 128,985 deaths from COVID-19, and the death rate per million of population was just under 1,900.

True, there are countries with worse rates, including Hungary, Italy and the Czech Republic in Europe. But countries that have taken a different approach have vastly better figures: for example, 35.8 deaths per million of population in Australia, and 5.39 in New Zealand.

No doubt Boris Johnson’s government took its emphatic 2019 election victory and relatively successful vaccination program as a mandate for opening up.

But the current situation doesn’t support such optimism. Infection rates are now the worst in Europe and the death rate is climbing. By contrast, Australia has much lower death and infection rates but state authorities have responded with lockdowns.

Furthermore, many scientists have condemned the opening-up policy. The authors of the John Snow Memorandum stress the risks to the 17 million people in the UK who have not been vaccinated, and state:

[This approach] provides fertile ground for the emergence of vaccine-resistant variants. This would place all at risk, including those already vaccinated, within the UK and globally.

Taking the UK to court

Is it enough to hope Boris de Pfeffel Johnson will not just dismiss these concerns as piffle? Perhaps there is an alternative — taking the UK to court. Specifically, to the international courts that deal with matters of human rights.

For countries in the Council of Europe, this would be the European Court of Human Rights. Globally, there is the option of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations.

How would this work? A court claim requires what lawyers call a “cause of action” — in this case, a breach of human rights, including the right to life and the right not to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment.

Read more: July 19 'Freedom Day': Boris Johnson's biggest gamble is trusting the public

In the main international human rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 6 requires that the right to life, which belongs to everyone, must be protected. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) says the same.

In 2019, the UN Human Rights Committee noted this right to life amounts to an “entitlement […] to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death”.

It also noted the obligation on states to take steps to counter life-threatening diseases.

A duty to protect

European Court of Human Rights case law establishes that the duty to protect life includes a requirement on states to take reasonable steps if they know (or ought to know) there is a real and immediate risk to life.

This has usually involved the criminal actions of dangerous people, but there is no reason it should not cover government policy that rests on an acceptance that people will die.

After all, the entire human rights framework was put in place to limit states from breaching rights.

Read more: No, we can’t treat COVID-19 like the flu. We have to consider the lasting health problems it causes

This duty to protect applies not just to deaths. Both the ICCPR and the ECHR have absolute prohibitions on inhuman and degrading treatment. For many people, the severity of COVID-19, including the consequences of long COVID, meet this standard.

If government policy can mitigate such consequences, human rights standards mandate that it should.

In short, this is not just a matter of the right to health. Because the UK will likely allow the virus to spread from its shores, the rest of the world is at risk and therefore has an interest here. So can other countries take action?

A political calculation

Human rights conventions are treaties — promises by states to each other as to how they will act. Article 33 of the ECHR is very clear: states can ask the European Court of Human Rights to adjudicate whether another state is breaching rights. There are many instances of this happening.

Importantly, the court can issue “interim measures” under its procedural rules to preserve the status quo while it hears a case.

Read more: The UK's speedy COVID-19 vaccine rollout: surprise success or planned perfection?

The UN Human Rights Committee may also consider state-to-state complaints under article 41 of the ICCPR if a state has agreed to this — and the UK has made the relevant declaration.

Of course, any decision by a state to take another to court is political. But this pandemic is not just a health issue, it is also a matter of life and death. Protecting life should be a political priority precisely because it is such a fundamental right.

Politicians willing to stand up for human rights should use the tools that exist to achieve that aim.

Kris Gledhill, Professor of Law, Auckland University of Technology

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.